Traditional statistical and fizzy approaches to describing uncertainty are continuous in the sense that we use a (potentially infinite) set of valuesfi.om the interval [O, 1 1 to characterize possible degrees of uncertainty. In reality, experts describe their degree of belief by using one of the finitely many words from natural language; in this sense, the actual description of expert uncertainty is granular.
Introduction
In statistical approach to uncertainty, all values from [0,1] are needed. In the traditional statistical approach to uncertainty, the uncertainty of an event E is described by its probability, which is a number from the interval [0, 1] . In many physical situations, this probability gradually (and continuously) changes fiom 0 to 1.
As a result, due to the known property of continuous functions, for each number from the interval [0, 1] , there is a moment of time when this particular number represents a probability of a real-life event. Thus, all numbers from the interval [0, 1] are needed to describe probabilistic uncertainty.
At first glance, it may seem that in fuzzy approach to uncertainty, also all values from [0,1] are needed. In fuzzy approach, uncertainty is also described by a number from the interval [0,1] which describes the degree to which the expert believes that a certain property holds.
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For many reasonable properties (like "small"), as the value of the corresponding physical quantity increase, the corresponding degree continuously changes from 1 to 0 (or from 0 to 1). Therefore, similarly to the probabilistic case, it looks like we need all (infinitely many) numbers from the interval [0,1] to describe fuzzy uncertainty. In reality, experts' description of their uncertainty is granular. There is a problem with this conclusion. One of the main goals of fuzzy logic is to formalize expert knowledge (and its uncertainty). Real-life experts, however, do not use infinitely many different values to describe their degree of certainty. They normally use a small finite number of alternatives: namely, one of the words describing uncertainty. Instead of infinitely many possible values from the interval [0,1], we only get finitely many words; each word therefore corresponds to a whole set (granule) of possible values. In other words, the actual description of uncertainty is granular. From the traditional viewpoint, granularity is a crude approximation. From the viewpoint of traditional probabilistic or hzzy approach, this granular description is a crude approximate description of the continuous uncertainty. One can expect such an approximate behavior fiom a simple crude system which does not have enough memory or computing power to process too many possible degrees of certainty. But is it? However, it is unclear why a human brain, the result of billions of years of evolution from simple onecell organisms to sophisticated thinlung abilities, would use such a low quality crude approximation scheme.
So maybe granularity is not a crude approximation scheme? Maybe granularity is, vice versa, a high quality (or even optimal) scheme for describing uncertainty? 0-7803-6274-8/00/$10.00 O 2000 IEEE What we are planning to do. In this paper, we show that granularity is, indeed, a high quality (and even optimal) scheme for describing uncertainty.
In our derivation, we will use the standard techniques of continuous mathematics, in line with our general results from [3] showing that continuous mathematics is a very helpful tool in justifying different techniques for handling uncertainty.
Towards the Formalization of the Problem
Preliminary idea: experts strife to increase the certainty. How can we formalize this problem? We want to describe the uncertainty of human knowledge. This knowledge consists of several different statements S I , . . . , S,. We are considering the situation in which the uncertainty of each statement is characterized by a number from the interval [0,1]; in other words, the uncertainty of human knowledge is described by assigning n numbers dl , . . . , d, to the statements which form a knowledge base.
Experts do not simply keep the knowledge about their area of expertise, they also strife to increase the amount of knowledge, either by extracting new pieces of knowledge from the experimental data, or by using logical arguments to extract new knowledge and new statements from the already known ones.
Since the memorization abilities of each individual expert are limited, an expert invariable forgets some of the knowledge that he previously knew. This "forgetting" is important because it allows us to clear the memory for new ideas and new results. However, while individual experts may forget part of the knowledge, from the viewpoint of the whole community of experts, the total amount of knowledge (normally) increases.
The final goal of experts as a group is to attain ful1 knowledge of a certain domain, when we would be able, given each statement, to decide whether this statement is true or not. From this viewpoint, the ideal degree of certainty for each statement is either 0 or 1.
If the degree of certainty is 0, this means that for the negation of this statement, the degree of certainty is equal to 0. Thus, without losing generality, we can say that an expert strives to make his degrees of certainty di as close to 1 as possible, i.e., as large as possible.
Ramification of the preliminary idea: experts strife to increase the certainty within limited resources. Each increase in the degrees of certainty (i.e., each decrease in uncertainty) requires a certain effort, often, a very substantial effort. The expert's resources are usually limited. So, an optimal behavior for an expert would be: Within the given total effort, to maximize the resulting certainty, Let us formalize this requirement.
First step towards formalization: describing effort.
We are trying to formalize the fact that experts have a limited number of resources and that, therefore, they can only use a limited amount of effort.
The effort e ( E , d ) which is necessary to achieve a given level of certainty d for a given statement E depends both on the level d and on the statement E : 0 the larger required degree of certainty, the more efforts are needed, so e ( E , d) is an increasing function of the degree d; 0 also, for some statements, their checking requires much more time and effort than for the others, so the necessary amount of effort e ( E , d ) depends not only on the degree d, but also on the statement E.
This function describes what effort is necessary for a single statement. If two statements El and E2 are completely unrelated, then clarifying one of them does not in any way help us to clarify the second one. Thus, for unrelated statements, if we want to achieve the degree of certainty dl for the first statement and the degree of certainty d2 for the second statement, then the required effort can be simply computed as a sum of the efforts corresponding to these individual statement, i.e.,
as e(E1,dl) +e(&,d2).
In real life, statements are rarely unrelated.
0 Sometimes, the statements are logically related; e.g.,
El implies E2. In this case, if we increase the degree of certainty dl in the statement E l , we automatically increase the degree of certainty in the statement Ez. Therefore, the effort used to increase the degree of certainty in El helps in increasing the degree of certainty in E2. As a result, the amount of efforts required to achieve both the degrees dl and d2 is (when dl M d2) practically equal to the effort e(E1, d l ) necessary to achieve the degree dl and thus, much smaller than the sum e(E1,dl) + e ( & , & ) .
this case, the total effort required to achieve both degrees of certainty is much larger than simply the sum of the efforts e( El, d l ) + e( E2, d2).
In some cases, the total effort is smaller than the sum; in some other cases, the total effort is much larger than the sum. It is reasonable to assume that for a large number of statements which may be related in different ways, on average, these positive and negative deviations from the sum more or less compensate each other. In the resulting approximation, the total effort of achieving certainty In some other cases, there is a synergy between the statements El and E2. For example, these statement may cover two possible cases of some general interesting statement, and thus, the satisfaction of confirming both statement Ei with certain degrees of certainty means that we have covered the general statement as well. As a result, in this case, the total amount of satisfaction obtained from achieving both degrees of certainty is much larger than simply the
sum ofthe satisfactionvalues s(E1, d l ) +s(Ez, d 2 ) .
In some cases, the total satisfaction is smaller than the sum; in some other cases, the total satisfaction is much larger than the sum. It is reasonable to assume that for a large number of statements which may be related in different ways, on average, these positive and negative deviations from the sum more or less compensate each other. In the resulting approximation, the total satisfac- 
Solution of the Formalized Problem Explains Granularity
Analytical solution to the above problem. The above conditional optimization problem can be easily solved by using the standard calculus technique of Lagrange multipliers, according to which the above conditional optimization problem can be reduced to an unconditional one
where C is a constant (Lagrange multiplier).
For this unconditional optimization problem, the maximum can be computed by simply differentiating the objective function with respect to di and equating the resulting partial derivative to 0. As a result, we get the follow- This analytical solution explains granularity. Intuitively, small changes in the certainty degree d should not drastically affect neither the average effort e(d) required to achieve this degree, nor the average satisfaction s(d) resulting from achieving this degree. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the functions e ( d ) and s(d) are smooth and probably even analytical (i.e., can be expanded in Taylor series). In this case, the fbnction F ( d ) is also an analytical function defined on the interval [0,1]. It is known that an anlytical function which is not identically 0 can only have finitely many roots on an interval.
Thus, all the optimal degrees of certainty di must belong to the finite set of these solutions.
For usual analytical functions, this set of solutions is small. Indeed, an arbitrary analytical function, by definition, is equal to its Taylor series and therefore, can be approximated, with an arbitrary accuracy, by a polynomial. A polynomial of degree 7~ can have no more than 7~ roots; so, e.g., if a cubic polynomial is a reasonable approximation for the function F ( d ) , then, in this approximation, the function F ( d ) has no more than 3 roots, so we use no more than three different levels of certainty. A more accurate approximation, e.g., by a 7-th order polynomial (which is usually enough to visually coincide for most knownanalytical functions on [0,1] such as sin, cos, etc.), would reveal no more than 7 different degrees of certainty, etc. In other words, no matter how many statement we consider, for each of these statements, the optimal degree of certainty di should belong to the same (small) set. Thus, even if we start with the degrees which can, in principle, take arbitrary values from the interval [0,1], we end up showing that in the optimal assignment, only a few of these values will be actually used.
Hence, granularity is indeed optimal. Then, the optimal levels of activity can be determined by solving the optimization problem (l), (2). We already know, from the solution to this problem, that in the optimal solution, the levels di cannot take arbitrary values, they should all belong to a small set of values. Therefore, the optimal activity schedule consists not of slowly changing activity from one level to another, but of switching between several discrete levels of activity.
Similar Ideas Can
This conclusion explains why, instead of a slow transition between high and low activity, most living creature have an abrupt transition between activity and sleep.
If we take subtler details into consideration, then we can say that the above conclusion explains why living creatures have an abrupt transition between activity and several levels of sleep such as a REM phase and a normal sleep. Similarity with "bang-bang'' control in control theory. The above conclusion is consistent with the fact that in control theory, the optimal control often involves abrupt changes from one regime to another. For example, when driving a car, stability means, in particular, that once the car swerved, it should return to the original trajectory. The faster it returns, the more stable is the system. Therefore, from the viewpoint of stability only, the ideal (optimal) control would be the one that brings the car back on track in the shortest possible time (i.e., with the largest possible acceleration).
The non-smoothness of the optimal control is not a peculiar feature of the car example: in control theory, there are general theorems that show that under certain (reasonably general) conditions, the optimal control is indeed of the above-described "bang-bang" type (see, e.g., [2] ; not incidentally, the word "bang-bang" is an "official", welldefined and widely used term in control theory).
Application to consumption. Similarly, for a person with limited resources, the consumption schedule which leads to the largest satisfaction is not the schedule in which these resources are equally distributed, but rather the schedule in which periods of higher consumption ("feasts") are abruptly changing to periods of lower consumptions ("fasts"). This conclusion is in good accordance with the results obtained by economists who 5111-alyzed more complicated economic models (see, e.g., Application to traffic control. In traffic, similar idea explains why the optimal traffic arrangement means that we fix a small number of speed levels, and assign (maybe dynamically) each road to one of these levels. In real life, such levels are freeway, city limits, school zone, etc.
Application to learning. In learning, the optimal distribution in learning activity is not a steadfast study, but rather periods of intense study separated by periods of relative rest.
Similarly, if we analyze the distribution of learning activity in the population, so that di described the amount of effort used to educate i-th person, we come to the conclusion that the optimal arrangement is not when the teaching efforts are uniformly distributed among students or when there is a continuous change from one student to 1,411.
another, but rather when there are a few levels and each student is assigned to a certain level of studying.
This result is in good accordance with the discrete system of university education, where the possible levels of education in a given domain are described in terms of a small list of degrees (e.g., BSc, MSc, Ph.D.).
Possible Future Work
So far, all we got was a justification of granularity as a high-quality approach to the description of uncertainty. However, since we know where this granularity comes from, for new problems, we can not only just& granularity, but we can also find the optimal level of granularity.
